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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (NAME PARA 1)

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Classified By: Political Minister/Counselor Kathy Allegrone for Reasons 1.4(b), (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT RevCon), France will continue to be a critical P3 ally while on certain issues also maintaining tactics or positions different from our own. Post deals extensively with the GOF on nuclear issues, and reftel B contains much of the information requested in reftel A. However, post welcomes this opportunity to fill in the gaps with supplemental information, and questions from reftel A will be answered individually below, making reference as appropriate to previous reporting. END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF)-- What is the host government's general attitude towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions?

The GOF's attitude towards these issues are dealt with in detail in reftel B. France's positions are influenced by a recognition of nuclear proliferation as a significant threat to French national security, as well as by a strong political attachment to a nuclear deterrent force as the ultimate guarantee of national sovereignty.

-- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts is the host government likely to take in upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review Conference in 2010?

France strongly supports CTBT in all relevant fora. France also supports negotiations towards an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament, but is unwilling to consider any formulation that addresses existing stockpiles. France plans to coordinate its strategy at the 2010 NPT RevCon closely with the United States, but currently seems at odds with U.S. policy on specific issues, including the French desire to focus on nonproliferation and specific proliferators as

opposed to a strong push on disarmament. Although France considers itself a global leader on disarmament after having cut its nuclear arsenal to around 300 weapons and halted production of fissile material, French officials have warned that they see U.S. and UK public statements on disarmament efforts as offering an excuse to non-aligned nations to shift the focus at the 2010 RevCon from nonproliferation to actual progress on disarmament. See reftel B for further details.

-- With which countries does the host country work most closely on these issues?

France is first and foremost interested in working with the United States to influence our policies on the above issues, as well as for the P3 to present a united front to China and Russia and to key non-aligned movement (NAM) nations. The GOF also regularly engages the UK, whose strong commitment to disarmament concerns the French, especially given the similar size of the French and British nuclear arsenals. Within the P5, France has voiced concerns about China's lack of transparency, especially regarding its production of fissile materials (the GOF supports a moratorium), and supports P5 engagement in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon. French officials have also pointed out the need to reach out to key NAM countries, especially Brazil and Indonesia, to prevent spoilers at the 2010 RevCon. Finally, Egypt is of special concern to France in light of what French officials see as increasingly inflexible Egyptian diplomacy on Middle East issues, both at the IAEA and in the NPT review process.

-- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as defense and energy), and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora?

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
¶1. Jacques Audibert, U/S (P)-equivalent
¶2. Martin Briens, DAS-equivalent for Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation

Elysee (Office of President Sarkozy):
¶1. Francois Richier - Presidential Advisor for Strategic Affairs
¶2. Admiral Edouard Guillaud - Chief Military Advisor to the President
¶3. Antoine Beaussant - Deputy Military Advisor to the President

Ministry of Defense:
¶1. Michel Miraillet, Director of Strategic Affairs (USDP-equivalent)

Atomic Energy Commission:
¶1. Daniel Verwaerde, Director of Military Applications
¶2. Olivier Caron, Director for Strategy and External Relations

New York (UN):
¶1. Gerard Araud, PermRep (appointed, but as of August 26, has not yet replaced Jean-Maurice Ripert)
¶2. Xavier Chatel, First Committee Affairs (Disarmament and Non-proliferation)

Vienna (UN Agencies, including IAEA):
¶1. Philippe Merlin, Deputy PermRep
¶2. Marc-Gerard Albert, Counselor for Nuclear Issues

Geneva (CD):
¶1. Eric Danon, PermRep
¶2. Sophie Moal-Makame, Deputy PermRep

-- What role do you play in arms control and nonproliferation organizations? Do you take a leadership role on any issues?

France plays a very active role in all major arms control and nonproliferation organizations, including the UN, the IAEA, and the Conference on Disarmament and often takes a leadership role - preferably in coordination with the United States and the UK - with the aim of advancing French interests.

-- How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among government officials and agencies?

Overall policy direction is established by the President, with Elysee (presidency) advisors playing a significant role. The MFA has the lead on international negotiations, though other agencies have roles to play on specific issues. Thus, the Ministry of Defense is concerned with nuclear deterrent policy. The Atomic Energy Commission, which includes an international relations branch and a military applications branch, is responsible for maintaining France's nuclear arsenal and thus weighs in on FMCT issues, nuclear security, and civilian nuclear use, with the Ministry of Environment also sometimes involved in discussions of the latter issue. The Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale has an interest in all security affairs, but is less involved in nuclear issues than the Elysee staff, according to MFA contacts. Due to the relatively small size of the interagency group dealing with nuclear issues and the clear priorities established by the presidency, messaging is consistent. Bureaucratic rivalry does not seem to be a major obstacle on nuclear issues. Close and long-standing personal and professional relations create tight bureaucratic bonds between officials with extensive experience with nuclear issues. For example, former MFA Political Director Gerard Araud will now become France's UN PermRep, and has already worked closely with the MOD's Director of Strategic Affairs, Michel Miraillet, at numerous posts throughout his career. Araud has been replaced at the MFA by the former A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Jacques Audibert. Meanwhile, Presidential Advisor Francois Richier's last

position was as deputy to the A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs at the MFA.

-- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which issues?

President Sarkozy has taken a personal interest in nuclear issues, and the Elysee has clearly established France's priorities. Agency interests and responsibilities are outlined above, but since much of France's effort is currently focused on gaining U.S. and UK validation of its "redlines" in the run-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon, the MFA's diplomatic push is now central to the GOF's overall effort. Although Foreign Minister Kouchner has not personally involved himself, the rest of the MFA leadership, including Araud and now especially Audibert, remain influential (Note: Indeed, Audibert stated in a recent meeting that he expected to spend the majority of his time this coming year on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues). Although lower-ranking, Martin Briens' technical expertise has allowed him to play a prominent role in shaping and explaining France's diplomatic efforts. The Elysee - through Richier and Guillaud - directs and manages the GOF strategy, and is especially visible when President Sarkozy is personally involved, as in the run-up to the September 24 UNSC nuclear summit. Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte oversees the Elysee effort and is empowered to broker compromises on especially sensitive questions.

-- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control or nonproliferation issues?

This is discussed in detail in reftel B.

-- How many people in host country's missions (New York, Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they?

According to MFA contacts, deputies at relevant French missions are key interlocutors on actual negotiations, in addition to Ambassadors/PermReps. Names of relevant officials are given above.

-- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key relevant meetings?

Aside from the attendance of official delegations, MFA NPT desk officer Celine Jurgensen told us that mission personnel and resources are not generally augmented during key meetings. However, she said the MFA Office of Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation may be getting a new desk officer to deal specifically with FMCT.

-- What are the roles and influence of the host country's nuclear power industry (if any), academia, and non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making?

Academia and NGOs do not play a significant role in French arms control and nonproliferation decision-making. The French civilian nuclear industry, however, is one of the world's most developed and internationally active. The GOF strongly desires to foster French industry and sees the strengthening of a global nonproliferation regime as opening the door to increased - and politically uncontroversial - opportunities for French nuclear firms.

-- What are the key alliances with other governments on arms control and nonproliferation issues; for example, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77)?

France is most closely allied to the P3 countries and plans to devote significant effort to achieving P5 consensus

whenever possible. French officials are concerned that the NAM or G-77 countries will successfully divert attention from important nonproliferation goals by focusing too exclusively by disarmament by nuclear weapons states.

-- To what extent does the host government appear to influence, follow, or diverge from the NAM or G-77 line?

See above response.

-- How much flexibility do the Missions to the UN, CD, and IAEA appear to have, and to what extent do they appear to receive guidance from capital? To what extent do they need further guidance from capital to engage on RevCon objectives?

Post defers to USUN, Geneva, and Vienna for authoritative answers to these questions. In general, however, French positions reported by U.S. missions to arms control fora seem to track quite closely with what post hears from Paris-based officials.
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